Cash limits and the control of public expenditure in the United Kingdom by Deadman, Derek F. et al.
Abstract 
Cash Limits and the Control of Public 
Expenditure in the United Kingdom 
D. F. Deadman, F. Mealli and D. 1. Pyle* 
This paper uses a generalisation of intelVention analysis to examine quarterly data on UK 
public expenditure from 1963:1 to 1992:4. The aim is to test whether government policy, and 
particularly the introduction of cash limits, had any significant effect upon the level of real pub-
lic expenditure. Four series are examined. These are for (i) central government consumption, 
(ii) local authority consumption, (iii) general government capital formation and (iv) tranfer 
payments. No evidence is found of intelvention effects that can be attributed to cash limits. 
1. Introduction 
In the period since the early nineteen - sixties there has been a significant increase 
in the size of the UK's public sector, whether this is measured by the share of gen-
eral government expenditure in Gross Domestic Product or by the absolute level 
of expenditure itself. 1 
After the first oil crisis of 1973 - 4, the size of public expenditure began to be seen 
by different governments, for different reasons, as an obstacle to economic growth 
and prosperity. The Labour Government was under great pressure after 1976, from 
both the Treasury and the IMF, to reduce government spending so as to restore 
external equilibrium (Healey, 1989, pp. 429 - 30.). The 1979 election saw a new Con-
servative Government committed to rolling back the state, reducing the burden of 
taxation and restoring incentives. Reducing the level of public expenditure was seen 
as essential to this policy.2 
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1. Of course, this is only part of a much longer time trend that has existed since at least the 
end of the last century. See Brown and Jackson ( 1990, T 6.1, p. 164). It is also a phenome-
non that has been common in many other countries. See Mueller (1993, T 17.2, p. 322). The 
explanation of this occurrence has spawned a vast literature, but is not the main focus of this 
paper. 
2. The 1979 Conservative Party Manifesto argued that "The State takes too much of the na-
tion's income; its share must be reduced." ( quoted in Lawson, 1993, p. 103 ). Lawson (1993) 
also says "We (the new Conservative Government) ... resolved that our first Budget should 
make a decisive start to the process of reducing the deficit, and to do so entirely by cutting 
government spending." ( p. 31. ). 
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The objective of this paper is to determine whether Government policies, and 
particularly cash limits, were effective in controlling the level of public expenditure 
in the UK. Cash limits were introduced into the public expenditure planning process 
in an experimental manner in 1974 - 5 in an attempt to control spending on various 
central and local government building projects, following significant increases in ten-
der prices in this area.3 However, in 1976 - 7 they were rather more widely adopt-
ed as a control device running alongside the more traditional volume planning of 
public spending, which had been introduced as a result of the Report of the Plow-
den Committee in 1961. Between 1976 and 1982 cash limits operated in tandem 
with volume planning, although cash limits overrode volume decisions where there 
was any conflict ( Likierman, 1988). From 1982 onwards cash limits were used as 
the sole basis for public expenditure planning in the UK. 
It has been argued that cash limits were introduced in part because the system 
of volume planning was extremely difficult to understand. For example, it was al-
most impossible to relate expenditure in so - called "survey" prices to actual outlays.4 
Indeed, estimates of expenditure in survey prices were often referred to as "funny 
money", even by Whitehall civil servants. (Likierman, 1988). Yet, it has been also 
claimed by a former Chancellor of the Exchequer that Government Departments 
understood only too well how the system operated and used the confusion be-
tween survey prices and current prices to increase their spending beyond the planned 
magnitudes.( Healey, 1989 ).5 
Cash limits were meant to introduce greater financial discipline into the planning 
and control of the overall level of public expenditure ( see HMSO, 1976, para 3. ). 
In 1976 the Labour government was under considerable pressure from the IMF to 
prune public expenditure (Treasury Bulletin, 1993, p. 20). Cash limits, which are 
unlikely to be relaxed even if there are cost increases which are beyond the control 
of public sector managers, act as a strong incentive to civil servants to keep within 
fheir budgets, although it is rather unclear what the punishments would be if De-
partments were to persist in overspending. 
3. See Cash Limits on Public Expenditure, Cmnd 6440, HMSO (1976). Cash limits repre-
sent a planned limit on cash outlays fQr the coming financial year (HMSO, 1976, para 7). 
4. "Survey" prices refer to prices prevailing at the time at which the Public Expenditure Sur-
vey was undertaken, which was normally in the November of the year preceding the first year 
of the planning period. 
5. Dennis Healey, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1976, in referring to public ex-
penditure planning and control, says " ... my task was complicated by the Treasury's inability 
to know exactly what was happening, or to control it ... This was one of the reasons why I de-
cided to fix cash limits on spending ... , since Departments tended to use inflation as a cover 
for increasing their spending in real terms." ( Healey, 1989, p. 401.). This is not necessarily 
a contradiction, if the spending Departments understood how the system worked, but the con-
trolling Department ( the Treasury) did not. 
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The election of a Conservative Government in 1979, committed to reducing both 
the share and the absolute size of the government sector was expected to lead to a 
further tightening of the controls on public expenditure ( Lawson, 1993, p. 34 ). How-
ever, the structure of the process was left essentially unaltered. Instead the gov-
ernment acted to close various loopholes in the cash control system and to supple-
ment cash controls with limits on borrowing and manpower restrictions in the civil 
service. It soon became obvious that manpower targets were unnecessary and so 
they were dropped.6 
Of course, not all public expenditure has been, or indeed can be, cash limited. 
The most notable exceptions to the operation of cash limits have been (i) expendi-
ture on social security, which must, of necessity, be demand determined7 and (ii) 
local government current expenditure. In effect most transfer payments lie out-
side the cash limits system, the only exception being payments from the Social Fund, 
which was introduced in 1988 in order to reduce the amount of discretion given to 
local benefit offices. In practice about forty percent of public expenditure is cash 
limited ( or about two - thirds of supply expenditure )8, a proportion that has changed 
little since the system was introduced ( Likierman, 1988 ). 
Whilst cash limiting various central government expenditure programmes might 
be expected to be quite successful, the control of local government expenditure 
has proved altogether more problematical. The main problem confronting central 
government control of local government expenditure was the fact that local gov-
ernments have their own sources of income, such as local taxes and receipts from 
the sale of local services, which can be used to thwart central government controls. 
Also, local governments could borrow to finance expenditure, so that reducing 
central government grants to local government may not have a direct impact upon 
local government expenditure. In the nineteen - eighties the biggest problem con-
fronting central government's attempts to control public spending was its inability 
to control local government spending directly. Various attempts were made to tight-
en controls over local government expenditure, the most important of which were 
the introduction of rate - capping of selected local authorities in 1984 - 5 and the 
6. The government did set up an Efficiency Unit in the Cabinet Office, but this was not ex-
pected to achieve expenditure savings on the scale required. ( see Lawson, 1993, p. 34 ). 
7. Once qualification criteria and rates of payment are determined expenditure depends sole-
ly upon the number of qualified claimants coming forward. A government could not tum 
away unemployed people on the grounds that the budget for unemployment benefit had been 
exhausted. As a result the whole of the social security budget was excluded from the cash lim-
it process. Other major exclusions included housing subsidies, agricultural support and family 
practitioner services. Whilst cash limiting local government current expenditure was not pos-
sible, the financial assistance to local government by central government was cash limited. 
8. Supply expenditure consists of expenditure by central government that is financed by funds 
made available by Parliament. For an explanation of its relationship to total public expen-
diture see HM Treasury ( 1988, chart 6 ). 
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expenditure capping of all local authorities from 1992 - 3 onwards. ( Audit Com-
mission, 1993 ) 
The other main problem area for control PlLrposes was the National Health 
Service ( NHS). Here the problems were related to the cost of drugs and to wage 
costs. To deal with the former, in 1985 the government introduced a 'limited list' 
of drugs from which doctors were expected to prescribe. Pay in the NHS was large-
ly outside the control of Central Government, being determined by independent pay 
review bodies. Often these granted pay increases above those implicit in the cash 
limit for the NHS. Whilst the government often implemented NHS pay awards in 
a staged manner, they were frequently forced to raise the cash limit for the NHS. 
(Harrison, 1989). 
Cash limits were not meant to be set in stone. They could.be exceeded, but the 
intention was that they should not normally be changed. The two main reasons for 
relaxing them were (i) a change in policy made during the course of a financial 
year, and (ii) a change in circumstances which the government decides to accom-
modate, such as a rise in costs caused by a fall in the exchange rate. In fact, according 
to one commentator ( Likierman, 1988 ), cash limited items tended to be under-
spent, a tendency that was possibly accentuated by the increased flexibility that was 
granted to central government departments to carry forward any underspending 
on their capital allocation into the next financial year. This scheme was first intro-
duced in 1983 - 4 ( HM Treasury, 1988, para 51 ). ( Appendix 2 contains informa-
tion on cash limits and outturn for broad aggregates of public expenditure. ) 
Concern in central government over the control of public expenditure has led 
most recently to the announcement of a new approach to the control of public ex-
penditure ( Treasury Bulletin, 1992). However, this change relates primarily to 
the definition of the public expenditure total to be controlled rather than to a change 
in the cash limit system, which will remain at the heart of the process.9 
In analysing cash limits there are essentially two issues, which need to be kept 
apart. The first is whether their introduction was successful in keeping govern-
ment spending within planned limits and whether cash limits were more successful 
at doing this than previous control devices. lO This is a relatively uninteresting ques-
tion. As there was no real control mechanism before the introduction of cash lim-
its almost anything was bound to be more successful than anything that had gone be-
9. The new control total, as it is called, excludes (i) privatisation proceeds and (ii) social se-
curity spending related to unemployment and in-dudes local authority self - financed expen-
diture. 
10. This was certainly the original intention of cash limits. The 1976 White Paper dearly shows 
that the government intended to use cash limits as a control device for the current financial 
year and medium term planning was undertaken in constant prices. However, there was a 
gradual shift of emphasis away from planning in real terms, so that by 1982 it was aban-
doned altogether. 
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fore. It is also fairly easy to show ( see Appendix 2 to this paper) that after the in-
troduction of cash limits, government departments almost universally underspent 
their budgets. However, this could arise if generous cash limits had been set in the 
first place. In a sense seeing that central government departments stayed within 
their cash limit tells us little that is interesting. 
The second, and much more interesting, question is whether the introduction of 
cash limits led to a reduction in the level or rate of growth of government spending 
in either real or nominal terms. In other words, did the introduction of cash limits 
represent the main vehicle by which government expenditure cuts were delivered. 
It might be argued that one should look for evidence of expenditure cuts in terms 
of what happened to planned levels of government spending. However, as Dennis 
Healey has argued, when planning was undertaken in real terms departments were 
often able to mislead the Treasury about real spending. In any case what is impor-
tant from a policy viewpoint is what actually happened to expenditure, not what was 
intended to happen. In effect without cash planning cutting public expenditure would 
have been extremely difficult if not impossible. However, whilst cash planning 
may be necessary in bringing about a reduction in government spending it is not suf-
ficient in its own right. The limits need to be tight. The purpose of this paper is to 
test statistically if the introduction of cash limits, which supposedly represented a 
significant change in regime and attitude, led to a significant change in the level/rate 
of growth of public expenditure. 
2. Methodology and data. 
In order to determine whether Government policies, particularly cash limits, were 
successful in controlling the overall level of public expenditure, we have analysed 
various time - series of public expenditure using a development of intervention analy-
sis proposed by Tsay ( 1986, 1988). Recent applications of this method include analy-
ses of outliers in agricultural land values (Lloyd, 1993) and in macroeconomic time 
series (Blake and Formby, 1994 ). An account of the method is given in Mills (1990). 
Traditional intervention analysis ( Box and Tiao, 1975 ) assumes a specific known 
point at which a structural break may have occurred. Although the dates at which 
alterations to policy on cash limits were undertaken are known ( see the introduc-
tion to this paper ), the actual timing of the effects (if any) of such policy changes 
are much less certain. In traditional intervention analysis, an ARIMA model is fit-
ted to that part of the data set prior to the hypothesised structural break and it is 
assumed that the model appropriate to the 'pre-intervention' period continues to be 
appropriate for the 'post-intervention' period, subject only to the effects of the in-
tervention. It is not normal to use the full data sample in order to select the initial 
ARIMA model, as the presence of any intervention effect in the post - interven-
tion sample period may distort the model selection process. Although a particular 
form or effect of the intervention is prespecified in traditional analysis, different 
forms can be entertained and a choice made between these forms on the basis of 
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standard significance tests. 
In contrast to the traditional approach, the method used in this paper starts the 
ARIMA modelling on the assumption that there have been no intelvention effects 
over the whole sample period, so that the initial ARIMA model is chosen using 
the full data set. Tests are then undertaken using this model to identify aberrant be-
haviour in the residuals which may indicate some model misspecification. The form 
of intervention effects thus evolves from a sequence of tests performed in an itera-
tive way on a succession of estimated ARIMA models where, at each iteration, 
the data set is transformed to allow for the effect of the most significant identified 
structural change. 
This approach (which is essentially a data screening approach) seems particularly 
appropriate for this study, where neither the dates nor the forms of any intervention 
effects are clear. In particular, if one reaction to the introduction of cash limits 
was a rescheduling of, rather than a reduction in, expenditures, then this could ap-
pear as a change in the variance of the series. For example, the seasonal pattern of 
the series might be changed if budget holders need to curb spending in the final quar-
ter of the year in order to remain within their budget constraints. Such a variance 
change could mask other effects, such as changes in the level of expenditures. The 
iterative method proposed by Tsay (1986) is designed to address such a problem. 
In this paper we have examined a number of time series of government expen-
diture. The public expenditure series we have considered are (i) central government 
consumption expenditure, (ii) local government consumption expenditure, (iii) gen-
eral government capital expenditure and (iv) general government current transfer 
payments. All four series have been examined in real terms.ll All of the series are 
quarterly and cover the period from 1963:1 to 1992:4. Of these series, only that for 
transfer payments was not at any time cash limited ( see the discussion above) . This 
series is included in the analysis as a control series. There should not be any evi-
dence of a structural break in this series that could be attributed to the introduc-
tion of cash limits. 
Whether the series for local government consumption shows any evidence of an 
intervention effect, depends upon whether local governments were able to circum-
vent the attempts of central government to control their spending ( recall the dis-
cussion above ). The series for central government consumption and capital spend-
] I It is possible that the influence of cash limits could be detected in either the nominal or 
real series, although it is more likely to be detected in the real series. However, if government 
expenditure cash limits included inflation adjustments that were lower than recent inflation 
rates this would reveal a structural break in the nominal series after the introduction of cash 
limits. The problem with the nominal series is that a fall in the infl ation rate will also show a 
break in the series and this would not necessarily be related to the introduction of cash lim-
its. It is also clear from ministerial statements that it is the series for real spending that are 
paramount. 
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ing are, a priori, much more likely to show evidence of an intervention effect at-
tributable to the introduction of cash limits. However, the series for capital expen-
ditures might be subjected to other influences, such as the introduction of the end 
of year flexibility scheme in 1983 - 4. This raises the question as to whether cash lim-
its have affected the seasonal pattern of expenditures. 
In situations where agencies can defer expenditures into the next financial year, 
one might find that spending in the fourth quarter is reduced, while expenditure in 
the first quarter of the following year is higher, compared with a system without such 
a carry over facility. Without deferment there will be strong incentive for budget 
holders to spend any remaining balances in the final quarter of the year. Also, where 
there is no flexibility in the cash limit departments may adopt a cautious approach 
to spending in the early quarters of the financial year. The series for capital spend-
ing might be affected more than current expenditure in this respect, because of the 
increased opportunities to defer capital spending resulting from the introduction of 
greater flexibility in capital spending. As a consequence, the imposition of cash lim-
its and allowing greater flexibility in spending may have increased the seasonal ele-
ment in capital spending, in two, possibly conflicting, ways. 
3. An iterative approach to the detection of variance changes, outliers 
and level shifts. 
The basic model is a standard ARIMA model, which can be written as: 
<1>(B)zl = eo + e(Bpl (1 ) 
and where t is the explanatory variable ( government expenditure), at is a 
stochastic variable, taken as white noise, and B is the backshift operator such that 
B J z = Z .. t t-] 
Note that <P(B) could include unit root terms of the form (I-B) or (I_B4) to take 
account of non-stationarity in the underlying series. 
When there are outliers or structural changes present, Zt is unobservable. The ob-
served series, ~, is assumed to follow the model: 
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r; = fC.!)+ z, (2) 
where J(t) is specified as either a deterministic function to take account of out-
liers or changes in mean level, i.e. 
f (t) = w weB) ;:(d) o 8(B) ,:!, 
where ~;d) = 1 if t =d 
J= (d) 
and ,:>, = 0 if t ::f. d , 
or as a stochastic function in order to capture changes in variance, i.e. 
where e,(d) = 0 if t < d and e,(d) is NID (0, 02) for t :2: d. 
(3) 
(4) 
Unless there is an obvious structural break in the observed series which can be 
taken into account immediately (a single extreme value or outlier, for example), it 
is generally preferable to test for variance changes using equation (4) before con-
ducting the other tests on equation (3), because variance changes may mask these 
other effects. To conduct the test, an ARIMA model is fitted to the whole data sam-
ple assuming no intervention effects. The residuals, E, ,are obtained from this 
model, and the statistic: 
d - l 
(n-d +l)IE; 
,=1 
is computed for all h::; d ::; n - h where h is sufficient to allow variances to be , 
reasonably computed at each end of the data sample (h is taken as 25 in this study). 
Both minimum and maximum values of rd over the range of d are computed, and 
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the larger (denoted below as A) of the maximum and the inverse of the minimum is 
selected. This determines d, the point of a possible variance change. The maxi-
mum will be selected if there has been an increase in the variance of the series af-
ter t = d, and the inverse of the minimum if there has been a reduction in the vari-
ance at this point. A significant alteration in variance is identified if the value of A 
is greater than the appropriate critical value. Exact critical values are unknown, 
but are normally taken as 2.5 (10%),3.0 (5%) and 3.5 (1 %), based on the simula-
tion results computed by Tsay (1988). In this study, we have taken the critical val-
ue to be 3.0 in all cases. Should an increase in variance be detected, the data is ad-
justed as: 
y;* = Y; for t < d 
y* = Y + A -0.5 (y - Y) for t > d 
r r -
where Y is the sample mean of the data. 
A straightforward reversal of the inequali ties above provides the data transfor-
mation for the case of a variance reduction. A new ARIMA model is fitted to this 
adjusted data set, and a further variance change test is made. This process is re-
peated until no such changes are detected. The final adjusted series is then used 
to test for intervention effects other than variance changes. 
Several kinds of intervention effect are possible. These are level changes, tran-
sient changes, innovational outliers and additive outliers. Level changes and tran-
sient changes are familiar from standard intervention analysis. Level change mod-
els allow for permanent step changes in the series being modelled, whilst transient 
change models allow the intervention effect to die away over time. An additive 
outlier model allows a one period "pulse" in the data and would be appropriate in 
the case of a recording error in the data series, for example. The effect of an inno-
vational outlier depends upon the particular model which has generated the Zr val-
ues. That is, it dependes upon the particular parameter values of the rele-
vant stochastic model. The effect of the outlier may be permanent or temporary, 
as in general " .. .it influences the process Z{ on Zr' Zt - I , .. .. through the dynam-
ic structure ?(B) / ?(B)." ( Tsay, 1986, p. 
132). Tsay ( 1988, p. 3 ) notes that "In practice, an 10 often represents the onset 
of an external cause." 
Thus, in the innovational outlier (10 ) model , (2) is written as: 
(5) 
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so that a shock, OJ I , at time d is transmitted to Yd , Yd + 1 ,. . ... , through the mem-
ory of the model captured in An ordinary least squares estimate of OJ I 
is given by Ed' the value of the residual from the fitted ARlMA model at t = d. 
A test for the presence of an innovational outlier is based on the computation of 
0) 
the maximum value of the statistic A I = ~ over all 1 < d < n where a is the (J' 
estimated standard error of the residuals. If this statistic is greater than an appro-
priate critical value (computed by Tsay (1986) and Chang (1988) as 3.0 (10%), 
3.5 (5 %) and 4.0 (1 %)) and is greater than the corresponding statistics obtained 
for testing for the presence of additive outlier, transient change and level change 
models, then an fO model shock has been identified at time d. The data set is then 
modified to take account of this innovational outlier as follows: 
where 
y* = for all t = 1, 2, .. . . , d - r 
t 
Values of If! i can be obtained from the estimated polynomials for e( B) and 
¢(B) by the method of equating coefficients. 
In the additive outlier (AO) model, equation (2) is taken to be: 
(6) 
The ordinary least squares estimate of OJ A (the additive shock at t = d), is com-
puted for alII < d < n as: 
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The test statistic for the AO case is computed as the maximum value of 
OJ 
A =~ 
A ,d over alII < d < n. If the test statistic is greater than the critical 
ap A,d 
value for the test ( again taken as between 3.0 and 4.0 ), and is the highest of the 
test statistics calculated for the four potential types of structural break, then an ad-
ditive outlier is identified at t = d. The data are then simply transformed as: 
~* = ~ for t::j: d 
~* = ~ - OJ A,d for t = d. 
In the level change (LC) model, equation (2) becomes: 
~ = Zt fort < d 
1'; = Zt + OJ L,d for t :2: d (7) 
An ordinary least squares of OJ L,d is calculated from: 
2 nCB) 
the coefficient on Bi in the polynomial 1](B) = 1]0 -1]IB -1]2B - ..... =--
I B 
2 (1 2 2 2 )-1 
and where p L,d = . + 111 + 112 + ...... .. 11 Il- d • 
A OJ Ld 
The test statistic L,d = --' - is computed for aliI < d < n and its maxi-
ap L,d 
mum located. If this value is both greater than the selected critical value (as 
above) and is the largest of the four test statistics at this point in the calculations, 
a level change at t = d is located. For the next round of computations, the data 
are adjusted as: 
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r: * = r: for 1 < t < d 
Y/ = ~ - (J) L,d for t ~ d ' 
Finally, in a transient change (TC) model equation (2) is specified as: 
~ = Zt for t < d 
Y <;:t - d t = Z, + u COT ,d for t ~ d 
so that the effect of the intervent ion (W Td ) declines over time ( 6 is a preas-
(8) 
signed value between zero and one; in this study a value of 0,7 was adopted) , An 
ordinary least squares estimator of W T .d is given by: 
2 11 f{2 f{ 2 f{ 2 )-1 
and where PT,d = ~+I-'l +1-'2+ .. · .. l-'n- d 
for all 1 < d < n 
nCB) 
1-88 
A test statistic A T ,d (j) T ,d 
aPT,d 
is computed for all 1 < t < n and the maximum 
value located. If this is both greater than the selected critical value (as above) and 
the largest of the four test statistics calculated at this point in the computations, a 
transient change is detected at this time period. The data are then transformed as: 
y ' = y fo~ t < d t , 
* Y ii t - d ~ = ,- co T,d for d :S t :S n 
After any of the four data transformations above have been performed, the 
original ARTMA model is then used with this new data to compute new residuals, 
and the test statistics are recomputed. In this way inner iterations are performed us-
ing the originalARTMA model but with data adjustments at each iteration which 
try to correct for the most significant intervention located in the previous round. 
Only when no test statistic is significant is a new ARTMA model estimated, using 
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the last computed adjusted series as input. This new model becomes the first stage 
of the next outer iteration. This procedure stops when no significant interventions 
are located for such an iteration. 
4. Empirical Results 
In the following section we report empirical results obtained by using the esti-
mating procedure, described in the last section, on quarterly time - series data for 
government expenditure, which have been obtained from Economic Trends. For 
each of the series considered, the sample period was from 1963:1 to 1992:4 and, 
where necessary, series were converted into real terms by the application of a price 
deflator. Gross government domestic capital formation ( i.e. central plus local 
government investment) was deflated by a price index for all capitalgoods. This in-
dex was obtained by dividing a series for all capital formation, seasonally adjusted 
and in current prices, by the same series expressed in 1985 prices. These series are 
also available from Economic Trends. Seasonally unadjusted consumption expen-
diture in both current and 1985 prices was used to construct a price index for con-
sumption expenditure used in deflating the series on transfer payments. Econom-
ic Trends also publishes series in 1985 prices for local authorities' final consumption 
and central government final consumption expenditures. All computations were 
made using a combination of the BMDP computer package for the ARIMA mod-
elling and GAUSS for the computation of the test statistics. 
(i) Real Government Capital Formation, Seasonally Unadjusted. 
Figure 1 illustrates the general development of this series over the sample peri-
od considered. 'Eyeballing' this series suggests a possible increase in variance, which 
is perhaps connected to a changing seasonal pattern. As the methodology adopted 
presumes that this series will be modelled by an ARlMA process assuming no struc-
tural breaks, the normal convention of taking natural logarithms of the series to at-
tempt to model the increasing variance was followed. The resulting series is dis-
played in Figure 2. A variance increase in this series is still suggested. 
A satisfactory ARlMA model for this series, based on the statistical significance 
of coefficients, the 'randomness' of residuals judged from the autocorrelation and 
partial autocorrel ation functions and the Ljung-Box Q statistic of the residuals, 
and the under and over fitting of parameters, was a seasonal multiplicative ARIMA 
model, written in the usual notation as (1,0,0) x (1,1,0). . This represents a model 
with both regular and seasonal autorgressive terms, and no moving average paraeters. 
This initial model was estimated as: ( results are given in full in row 1 of Table 1) 
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A plot of the residuals from this model indicated that the combination of seasonal 
differencing and taking logarithms may be insufficient to model the changing vari-
ance of this series. The test described above in relation to equation (4) was com-
puted using the residuals from the initial fitted model. A variance change (increase) 
was detected at t = 41 (1973:1), and a modified series computed. A new A R1MA 
model was estimated for this modified series, which again proved to be adequately 
expressed as a multiplicative seasonal autoregressive process, that is a 
(1,0,0) X (1,1,0)4 model. 
This model was estimated as: 
The residuals from this model did not indicate a variance change, so that this mod-
el with its residuals could be used to test for the other structural breaks. Following 
Lloyd (1993, p.449), a critical value of 3.0 was adopted for 'high sensitivity'. Using 
this critical value, a variety of significant interventions were identified between t = 
103 (1988:3) and t = 111 (1990:3). Such a bunching of effects is normally taken as 
being indicative of a general model change for the series at around these periods 
(e.g. see Tsay (1988, p.1S)). The series was accordingly modified to take account 
of these breaks within this inner iteration. Specifically, as the first 'most signifi-
cant' intervention on the initial inner iteration was identified to be a transient change 
at t = 107, equation (8) was used to modify the series as follows: 
~: = ~ for t < 107 
Y * Y <;:t-!07 t = t - U (J) 107 for 107::=; t ::=; 120 , 
p2 ='i+~~+""~~3) d I [3 . 
'\ an t le I are obtained from 
In this case, 
and the 7r i values obtained by multiplying out and comparing coefficients. 
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The f3i coefficients were obtained analogously. The resulting series was then 
used along with the parameter values established for this inner iteration (0.747 
and -0.311) to derive a new set of residuals from which four new test statistics are 
computed and the largest identified. In this case, another transient change is 
found at t = 111 and the process above is repeated to derive a further modified 
series, and so on. For this inner iteration, the process stops after the series has 
been modified for an additive outlier at (again) t = 111 (see Table 1 ) as no sig-
nificant intervention effects are identified for this series. This modified series is 
then modelled as a new ARIMA process, forming the model for a next set of inner 
iterations. In this case, the new model was estimated as: 
(1- 8 4 )(1- 0.7588)(1 +0.3.968 4 )1'; = at 
No significant interventions were identified for this model. It should be clear that 
there are substantial computations involved in the calculation of the coefficients 
(which are model specific) necessary to compute each test statistic within any inner 
iteration, in addition to the estimation of a sequence of ARIMA models. 
From the above, we conclude that real government capital expenditure was subject 
to two interventions over the sample period. The series displays an increase in vari-
ance in 1973:2 ( period 41 ) and a change in structure indicated by the bunching of 
intervention effects from around 1988:3 (period 103 ), neither of which can be eas-
ily and directly associated with the introduction and operation of cash limits. 
Table1. 
ARIMA parameters 
Outer Inner Type Time Size RMS LBQ A 
Iteration Iteration 
0.743 -0.324 0.017 14 
(11.31) (-3.43) 
V 41 5. 
n 0.747 -0.311 0.004 10 
(11.98) (-3.41) 
TC 107 0.18 3. 
TC III 0.18 3 
3 10 103 -0.19 3. 
4 AO 107 -0.17 3. 
IO 105 0.20 3. 
6 AO III -0.14 3. 
III 0.758 -0.396 0.003 9.6 
(12.59) (-4.50) 
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(ii) Real Central Government Consumption Expenditure, Seasonally 
Unadjusted. 
Figure 3 illustrates the form of the (logged) series over the sample period. Re-
sults of model estimation are shown in Table 2. A satisfactory initial ARIMA 
model for this series was found to be a multiplicative seasonal model of the form 
(1,0,0) X 0,1,0) 4 . The residuals from the fitted model displayed no apparent vari-
ance alterations, and appeared random from the associated autocorrelation and par-
tial autocorrelation functions, and from the computed LBQ statistic. The adopted 
procedure failed to locate any intervention effects for this series, either of a variance 
(stochastic) type or of deterministic types, if a critical value of3.5 (suggested by Tsay 
(1988) as an appropriate 5% significance value) was adopted for the tests (see Table 
2). However, if the approximate 10% value of 3 suggested by Chang et al (1988) 
for 'high sensitivity' is adopted, then the interventions shown in Table 2 were locat-
ed. Following the data transformations implied by the initial chosen model and in-
terventions, a second ARIMA model was estimated in the form: 
(1-B4)(l-l/>IB)(1- l/>2 B4 )¥; =at -81at_I - 82a,_8 
As can be seen, as with the initial model no significant interventions would be 
identified using a critical value of 3.5, and only two (one at each end of the series) 
using the value of 3.0. The second model had no significant spikes in either the au-
tocorrelation or partial autocorrelation function of the residuals, and the residuals 
appeared random. The third ARIMA model based on the data transformations 
stemming from the second model was of the form : 
(1- B)(l- B4 )(l-l/> l B4)1'; = at - 8 1a,_1 - 82a, _3 - 8 3a,_8 
which indicated two further interventions, both towards· the start of the sample pe-
riod. The final model based on the data transformations stemming from the inter-
ventions of the third model was of the same form as the third model. 
No further intervention effects were located in model IV. Our conclusion is 
that unless a highly sensitive critical value is adopted, no significant intervention 
effects seem present for this variable. The adoption of the more sensitive critical 
value locates some effects at each end of the data sample, but there are no convincing 
intervention effects located at periods that can be easily linked with either the im-
position or the operation of cash limits. 
ARIMA parameters 
Outer Inner 81 82 83 ~1 
Iteration Iteration 
0.734 
(10.99) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
II 0.291 0.276 0.951 -0.581 
(2.69) (2.69) (21.68) ( -5.64) 
1 
2 
III 0.466 -0.207 0.560 -0.89 
(8.22) (-3.01) (7.90) (-12.1) 
1 
2 
IV 0.524 -0.273 0.564 -0.935 
(9.24) (-4.30) (9.57) (-17.10) 
Table 2. 
~2 Type Time 
-0.285 
(-3.00) 
10 10 
AO 89 
10 93 
10 17 
10 114 
10 18 
AO 46 
LC 19 
Size RMS 
0.0005 
0.067 
0.051 
0.061 
0.060 
0.0004 
0.063 
0.056 
0.0005 
-0.04 
0.04 
0.0004 
LBQ 
"-
17 
3.19 
3.28 
3.10 
3.24 
17 
3.27 
3.05 
23 
3.47 
3.57 
21 
~ ;:,.. 
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~: 
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'" ~ [ 
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(iiii) Real Local Authority Consumption Expenditure (Seasonally Unadjusted). 
Figure 4 illustrates the (logged) series for this variable over the sample period. 
'Eyeballing' this graph would suggest a possible outlier at t = 49 ( 1975:1 ). The se-
ries appears to grow faster before this time than after. The initial ARIMA model 
fitted to this series was a multiplicative seasonal ARIMA model of the form. 
(1,1,0) / (01,1)4· From the results reported in Table 3, it appears that there 
was a change of variance at period i7 ( i.e. 1982:1 ). In this case this variance al-
teration represents a reduction in the variance of the series, which might represent 
an alteration in the expenditure behaviour of local authorities at about this time (e.g. 
by a change in the seasonal pattern of expenditures). The variance of the first 76 
observations was reduced by transforming these observations by the method de-
scribed above. The model identifi ed and estimated using this revised data was of 
the same form as the first model. 
It appears that the variance change at time period 77 may in fact indicate a more 
basic model change at around this time as further in terventions are significant 
here. The evident additive outlier at time period 49 is also identified, along with a 
transient change in mean (a reduction) shortly before this in 1974:2. A level change 
(upwards) is identified towards the end of the series (1989:2), which also seems 
reasonable from the time series plot of the data in Figure 4. The final ARIMA mod-
el for which no significant interventions were detected was estimated from the last 
set of transformed data from the second iteration as: 
Table 3. 
ARIMA parameters 
Outer Inner 81 CPl Type Time Size RMS LB 
Iteration Iteration Q I~ ;:-
c--
I 0.867 -0.226 0.0003 24 I ~: (;; 
'" (-2.42) (17.48) I ~ 1 V 77 
" ;: 
II 0.919 -0.214 0.0001 19 I[ 
.Q, 
(23.93) (-2.28) I~ 
~ 
1 IO 77 0.05 Ie;' ~ 
'" AO '" 2 78 0.04 I~ §, 
3 AO 49 0.03 I ~. ;: 
4 TC 46 -0.02 11t 
~ 
5 LC 110 0.Q2 I ~ 
"-
:>:: 
81 94 I~ %-
III -0.137 0.878 0.00004 28 
, ;3i 
( -2.85) (19.69) 
1
00 
, w 
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(iv) Real General Government Transfer Payments. 
Figure 5 indicates the behaviour of this (logged) series over the sample period. 
It will be recalled that this series is used as a 'control series' in the sense that it rep-
resents expenditures that have not been cash limited. The initial ARIMA model se-
lected was: (1- f IB~(1- B~(1- B)yt = at - q la t-l- q 2'lt-8 
No variance change was detected for this model, although a Transient Change 
was detected at time period 47 ( 1974:3 ), and an Additive Outlier was detected at 
time period 89 ( 1985:1 ) (see Table 4). Both of these effects seem to be indicated 
in Figure 5, although the first predates the era of cash limits. The data were adjusted 
for these two intervention effects and a new model for the next outer iteration was 
estimated. This was of the form: 
There were no significant coefficients in either the autocorrelation or partial 
auto correlation function of the residuals. For this model, used in the next outer 
iteration, no interventions of any kind were detected. Our conclusion that cash lim-
its left this series unaffected is expected, but the result does, perhaps, give greater 
credibility to our linking of intervention effects with cash limits in the other series. 
5. Conclusion. 
Our overall conclusion, with respect to the success of cash limits in significantly 
reducing the level and/or the rate of growth of public expenditure, must be said to 
be fairly negative. The intervention effects, where found, seem to be more in the 
nature of changes in the pattern and timing of expenditure, reflected in variance 
changes for the series, rather than negative innovational or transient change outliers 
reflecting reductions in real expenditure. The method of Tsay used in this study does 
seem, however, to be a potentially useful technique for investigating series which 
may be subject to structural breaks especially where one is unsure of either the ex-
act break points or the form of the breaks. 
g 
'" Table 4. I;:: 
~. 
ARIMA parameters I ;:;' 
'" l:) 
;, 
"'-
Outer Inner <PI 91 92 Type Time Size RMS LBQ I~ 
(j 
Iteratio Iteration I~ ~ 
n I~ 
1:: 
~ 
I -0.767 0.195 0.508 0.0016 17 11';' t:>l {j 
" ( -9.21) (2.34) (4.53) I;'::.: 
~ 
1 TC 47 0.13 
;;; 
Is' 
s;.. 
" 2 AO 89 0.08 I~ 
~ 
II 0.199 0.718 0.0013 17 I~ 
;, 
"" (3.33) (12.08) l~ 
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Appendix: Cash Limits 1976-7 to 1993-4 
1. Central Government Votes 
£ million % 
Year Cash Limit Outturn Overspread ( + ) 
Underspread (-) 
1976-7 26,079 25,393 - 2.6 
1977-8 27,992 27,251 -2.6 
1978-9 30,252 29,799 -1.5 
1979-80 34,318 34,086 -0.7 
1980-1 40,684 40,237 -1.1 
1981-2 44,741 43,947 -1.8 
1982-3 48,757 47,732 -2.1 
1983-4 51,568 50,706 -1.7 
1984-5 54,083 53,582 -0.9 
1985-6 55,789 55,297 -0.9 
1986-7 59,634 58,736 -1.5 
1987-8 64,309 63,140 -1.8 
1988-9 67,036 66,124 -1.4 
1989-90 -0.8 
1990-1 90,507 90,333 -0.2 
1991-2 101,388 100,956 -0.4 
1992-3 114,173 113,241 -0.8 
1993-4 120,706 119,715* -0.8 
* a provisional figure 
Figures have been rounded to the nearest £million 
Sources: Various white papers on cash limits outturn 
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2. Expenditure not voted in estimates (essentially local government and other 
bodies' capital expenditure) 
fmillion % 
Year Cash Limit Outturn Overspread ( + ) 
Underspread (-) 
1976-7 2,692 2,229 -17.2 
1977-8 4,594 4,080 -1l.2 
1978-9 5,135 4,599 -10.4 
1979-80 5,379 5,264 -2.1 
1980-1 6,645 6,382 -4.0 
1981-2 7,305 6,347 -13.1 
1982-3 7,878 6,685 -15.1 
1983-4 6,983 7,349 +5.2 
1984-5 6,838 7,777 + 13.7 
1985-6 7,143 8,043 + 12.6 
1986-7 7,797 7,981 +2.4 
1987-8 8,559 7,913 -7.5 
1988-9 5,477 5,313 -3.0 
1989-90 6,107 6,050 -0.9 
1990-1 10,378 10,251 -1.2 
1991-2 11,715 11,598 -1.0 
1992-3 13,591 13,436 -1.1 
1993-4 12,966 12,802* -1.3 
* a provisional figure 
Figures have been rounded to the nearest £million 
Sources: Various white papers on cash limits outturns 
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Figure 1: Real General Government Capital Fonnatlon 
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Figure 2: Real Government Capital Fonnatlon ( in natural 
logs) 
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Figure 3: Real Central Government Consumption 
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Figure 4: Real Local Government Consumption 
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Figure 5: Real Government Transfer Payments 
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